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Abstrat
If nonontextuality is dened as the robustness of a system's response to a mea-
surement against other simultaneous measurements, then the Kohen-Speker ar-
guments do not provide an algebrai proof for quantum ontextuality. Namely, for
the argument to be eetive, (i) eah operator must be uniquely assoiated with a
measurement and (ii) ommuting operators must represent simultaneous measure-
ments. However, in all Kohen-Speker arguments disussed in the literature either
(i) or (ii) is not met. Arguments meeting (i) ontain at least one subset of mutually
ommuting operators whih do not represent simultaneous measurements and hene
fail to physially justify the funtional omposition priniple. Arguments meeting
(ii) assoiate some operators with more than one measurement and hene need to
invoke an extra assumption dierent from nonontextuality.
Keywords: ommutativity, omeasurability, ontextuality, Kohen-Speker argu-
ment
1 Introdution: the main argument in brief
The aim of this paper is to hallenge the view that Kohen-Speker (KS) arguments
provide an algebrai proof for quantum ontextuality if nonontextuality is interpreted
as the robustness of a system's response to a measurement against other simultaneous
measurements.
As a start, it is worth diserning KS arguments from KS theorems. KS theorems
are simply mathematial theorems in form of a oloring problem, while KS arguments
are physial arguments devised to prove that quantum mehanis (QM) is ontextual.
The KS theorems start from a family of self-adjoint operators arranged on a hypergraph
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suh that the subsets of mutually ommuting operators dene the hyperedges
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A generalization of a graph where an edge an onnet any number of verties.
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A non-empty subset of verties.
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hypergraph.
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Two examples for suh a hypergraph are the GHZ graph (on the left) and
the Peres-Mermin graph (on the right). Here eah hyperedge is depited by an unbroken
line onneting 4 ollinear verties on the GHZ graph and 3 ollinear verties on the Peres-
Mermin graph. Next, one introdues value assignments on the graph, that is, funtions
assigning to eah vertex one of the eigenvalues of the operators represented by the vertex
in every quantum state. Sine the operators are typially projetions or ontrations,
the assignments generally yield the numbers 0, +1 and −1. The value assignments are,
however, onstrained by the so-alled funtional omposition priniple
4
(FUNC) requiring
that if the operators on a given hyperedge stand in a ertain funtional relation to one
another, then the values assigned to the operators should also stand in the same funtional
relation in every quantum state.
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In the ase of the GHZ graph, for example, the produt
of the operators on every hyperedge is the unit operator +1ˆ, exept for the horizontal
hyperedge, where the produt is −1ˆ. In the ase of the Peres-Mermin graph the produt
of the operators on every hyperedge is +1ˆ, exept for the third vertial hyperedge, where
it is −1ˆ. Sine the eigenvalues of eah operator on both graphs is ±1, FUNC allows
for only suh value assignments for whih the produt of the assigned numbers on every
hyperedge equals the produt of the operators (that is, +1 or −1) on that hyperedge. It
is easy to show that there is no suh value assignment on the above two graphs. More
generally, KS theorems provide omplex hypergraphs of operators suh that there is no
value assignment on the graph respeting FUNC. Some KS theorems work only in spei
quantum states, others aross all states. Thus, one an dierentiate state-dependent and
state-independent (algebrai) KS theorems.
To proeed from a KS theorem to a KS argument, one needs to provide a physial
interpretation for the KS graph. To this aim, one rst assumes that QM admits an
ontologial (hidden variable) model. In other words, one assumes that the quantum states
are simply distributions of underlying (dispersion-free) onti states. Next, one assoiates
the operators with observables and measurements. Measurements are lists of instrutions
to be implemented in the laboratory (Spekkens, 2005, p. 2) and observables are physial
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See e.g. (Abramsky and Brandenburger, 2011), (Cabello et al. 2014), and (Aín et al., 2015).
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Alternatively: the values assigned to mutually ommuting operators are the eigenvalues orresponding
to one of the ommon eigenstates of these operators.
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magnitudes whih haraterize a given quantum system. In a value-denite (deterministi)
ontologial model eah observable has a well-dened value in every onti state. Eah
observable is also assoiated with a measurement (proedure) suh that the outome of the
measurement reveals (faithfully) the value of the observable. Furthermore, eah observable
A and the orresponding measurement a is represented by a self-adjoint operator aˆ suh
that the values of the observable and the outomes of the measurement are just the
eigenvalues of the operator. The exat nature of these assoiations will be examined
below. Finally, one interprets the quantum probability of an operator's spetral projetion
assoiated with a given eigenvalue as the probability of the orresponding observables
having the value assoiated with that eigenvalue, and also as the onditional probability
of the outome assoiated with that value provided the orresponding measurement is
performed.
On this interpretation eah value assignment on a KS graph represents a possible
distribution of values in a given onti state whih the observables assoiated with the
operators on the graph an take and whih the orresponding measurements reveal. The
onstraint FUNC is justied as follows. Mutually ommuting operators on a hyperedge
have ommon eigenstates. If one prepares the system in one of these eigenstates, then the
funtional relationship between the operators will be realized as the funtional relationship
between the outomes of the orresponding measurements, and also between the values of
the assoiated observables. Note that to justify FUNC in an eigenstate, the measurements
need not be omeasurable (simultaneously measurable). But what justies FUNC in a
general quantum state? Here one an ome up with three answers.
First, one an say that any onti state featuring in the support of a general quantum
state must also show up in the support of at least one eigenstate.
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This answer, however,
is not very appealing. After all, why should every quantum state be omposed of the
same onti states as the eigenstates are?
Seond, one an say that the mutually ommuting operators {aˆi} of the graph rep-
resent simultaneous measurements {ai} and on performing these joint measurements one
an diretly observe the funtional relationship in question between the joint measurement
outomes and hene (assuming faithful measurement) between the values of the observ-
ables. Note that simultaneous measurements are understood here in the very physial
sense, namely as measurements whih an jointly be performed at the same time on the
same system. Also note that, although simultaneous measurements get represented in
QM by ommuting operators, the onverse is not true: from the mathematial fat that
ertain measurements are represented by ommuting operators it does not follow that
these measurements an be simultaneously performed. We ome bak to this important
point below.
Third, one an refer to the mathematial fat that for every set {aˆi} of mutually
ommuting operators sitting on a hyperedge there is an operator bˆ and funtions {fi}
6
Maroney and Timpson (2014) 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suh that aˆi = fi(bˆ). Thus, one an say that there is only one single observable B with a
orresponding measurement b and the set {aˆi} of mutually ommuting operators simply
represents the dierent funtions {fi(B)} of this very observable. Consequently, FUNC
holds trivially: it simply expresses the funtional relationship among the dierent fun-
tions of the outomes of b. Note that in this ase the measurements {fi(b)} assoiated with
{aˆi} an be alled simultaneously measurable only metaphorially sine one performs
only one single measurement, namely b, and applies the funtions to the outome.
Now we show that these latter two justiations of FUNC lead to two dierent re-
alizations of a KS graph. To redue metaphysis and to get loser to the experimental
testability, we eliminate the onept of observable from the disussion and adopt an op-
erational approah relying purely on operators and measurements. We all an assoiation
of the operators of a KS graph with measurements a realization of the graph. A real-
ization is unique if eah operator on the graph is assoiated with only one measurement
and non-unique if some operators are assoiated with more than one measurement. A
measurement assoiated with an operator is said to be realizing the operator. Now, in
the third justiations of FUNC above a set of operators {aˆi} sitting on a hyperedge is
realized by one single measurement b sine the funtions fi applied to the measurement b
are represented by aˆi. Call a realization hyperedge-based if there is at least one hyperedge
on the graph whih is realized by (dierent funtions of) one single measurement.
In a unique realization of the Peres-Mermin graph, for example, one has 9 dierent
measurements assoiated with the 9 verties (operators) of the graph. In a (maximally)
hyperedge-based realization of the same graph one has only 6 measurements assoiated
with the 6 hyperedges (three rows or and three olumns) of the graph. Can this latter
realization be unique? No, it annot, as the following simple lemma shows:
Lemma. A hyperedge-based realization in whih all sets of mutually ommuting operators
represent simultaneous measurements annot be unique.
Proof. Let aˆ1 be an operator sitting at the intersetion of two hyperedges suh that
all operators (among them aˆ1) on the one hyperedge are realized by a measurement
b. Suppose a ontrario that aˆ1 is realized only by b. Now, sine mutually ommuting
operators represent simultaneous measurements, the measurements realizing the operators
on the other hyperedge must be omeasurable with at least one measurement realizing aˆ1.
But there is only one measurement realizing aˆ1, namely b. Therefore, the measurements
realizing the operators on the other hyperedge are omeasurable with b. But then all
operators on the two hyperedges either represent funtions of b or measurements whih
are omeasurable with b. Assuming that simultaneous measurements get represented
by ommuting operators, this means that all operators on both hyperedges ommute.
Contradition. Consequently, aˆ1 annot be realized only by b.
That is, a realization of a KS graph where all sets of mutually ommuting operators are
realized by simultaneous measurements but some suh sets by one single measurement
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annot be unique. In other words, only the above seond justiation of FUNC an lead
to a unique realization, the third justiation always leads to a non-unique realization.
To avoid the no-go result of the KS argument, unique and non-unique realizations
follow dierent strategies. On a unique realization one bloks the argument by assuming
that at least one measurement (assoiated with an operator sitting at the intersetion of
two hyperedges) an have dierent outomes in an onti state depending on whether it
is simultaneously performed with measurements represented by operators on the one or
on the other hyperedge. On a non-unique realization, however, the argument an also be
bloked by assuming that dierent measurements represented by the same operator (at
the intersetion of two hyperedges) an have dierent outomes in a given onti state.
These two strategies for avoiding the no-go result represent two dierent interpreta-
tions of (non)ontextuality. On the rst interpretation, nonontextuality is the indepen-
dene of the outome of a measurement in every onti state from whih other measure-
ments it is simultaneously measured with. On the seond interpretation nonontextuality
is a perfet orrelation in every onti state between the outomes of two dierent measure-
ments represented by the same operator.
7
Note that the two interpretations are dierent
and logially independent.
Historially, the rst interpretation of nonontextuality goes bak to Bell, the seond
interpretation to Van Fraassen. Bell interprets nonontextuality as: the measurement of
an observable must yield the same value independently of what other measurements may
be made simultaneously (Bell, 1966/2004, p. 9). Van Fraassen's ontextuality, however,
is based on the insight that [t℄wo observables [a and b℄ are statistially equivalent if they
have the same probability distribution . . . In that ase they are represented in physis by
the same Hermitean operator. . . . But that does not mean that a = b (Van Fraassen,
1979, p. 158). In other words, two observables an be represented by the same self-adjoint
operator without being the same. But then, one is not fored to assign the same value to
them. Redhead (1989, p. 135) alls this fat ontologial ontextuality.
Many authors working in the operational approah (Spekkens, 2005; Hermens, 2011;
Leifer, 2014; et.) follow this seond interpretation. Spekkens, for example, writes: A
nonontextual ontologial model of an operational theory is one wherein if two experi-
mental proedures are operationally equivalent [that is, they are represented by the same
self-adjoint operator℄, then they have equivalent representations in the ontologial model.
(Spekkens, 2005, p. 1) There are also experiments devised to test nonontextuality in this
seond sense (Mazurek, 2016). The general idea behind this understanding of nonontex-
tuality, one again, is that if two measurementseven if they are not simultaneousare
represented by the same self-adjoint operator (whih, as Van Fraassen rightly says, em-
pirially just means that the outome statistis of the two measurement are the same),
then it is rational to assume that in every onti state the outomes (or more generally,
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Both denitions of nonontextuality an be generalized for probabilisti ontologial models by repla-
ing outome by probability distribution of the outomes.
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the probability distributions of the outomes) of the two measurements are also the same.
I don't doubt that this is a reasonable requirement on an ontologial model.
8
I think,
however, that this requirement is more losely related to the speial way in whih QM
is representing the onditional probabilities and muh less to the very onept of ontex-
tuality. If outomes of dierent measurements (dened via dierent lists of laboratory
instrutions) are represented by the same projetion, as happens in QM, then there might
indeed seem to be a need for the ontext to dismantle what was put together by the rep-
resentation. But this ontextuality is simply the onsequene of a speial representation
whih does not disriminate mathematially between that whih is dierent physially,
namely the outomes of dierent measurements. Had this dierene been respeted by
the representation, ontologial ontextuality would not arise.
If one relies, however, on the everyday usage of the term, then ontext refers simply
to the irumstanes in whih a ertain event, observation or measurement ours. These
irumstanes are not onstitutive in the denition of the very event or measurement, but
an signiantly inuene the ourrene of the event or the result of the measurement.
The important aspet of these irumstanes, however, is that they are simultaneously
present with the event or measurement. A possible ontext for a measurement in physis
is another measurement whih is performed simultaneously with the one in question.
(A non-simultaneous measurement annot provide suh a ontext sine it lives in another
possible world.) In this sense nonontextuality refers to a kind of robustness of the denite
response to a measurement on a given system, with respet to simultaneous measurements
that are also performed on the system. I will refer to this kind of nonontextuality as
simultaneous nonontextuality. If we understand nonontextuality in this way, we just
arrive at the above rst interpretation of nonontextuality.
I have no objetion against using nonontextuality in the seond sense as Spekkens
and many others use it. However, in this paper I will use nonontextuality exlusively in
the rst sense (that is, as simultaneous nonontextuality) and refer to the seond one as
Spekkens' ondition. My aim is to explore whether the KS arguments an prove that QM is
ontextual in the rst sense. The hallenge is then to onstrut (i) a unique realization for
a KS graph, that is, to assoiate eah operator of the graph with a dierent measurement
suh that (ii) mutually ommuting operators represent simultaneous measurements. We
stress that points (i) and (ii) are both important. Mutually ommuting operators must
represent simultaneous measurements, otherwise FUNC, on whih the whole KS theorem
is based, will not be physially justied. And the realization must be unique sine non-
unique realizations realizing ertain operators by more than one measurement need to
invoke nonontextuality in the seond sense that is, Spekkens' ondition. By abandoning
Spekkens' ondition (that is, by allowing the system to respond dierently to dierent
measurements represented by the same operator) one an always blok the KS argument.
In short, simultaneous measurability and unique realization are both sine qua non in
8
However, in Setion 13, I show a simple lassial ontologial models in whih this ondition is violated.
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proving quantum ontextuality.
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In the paper I will proeed as follows. First, I introdue the framework of operational
theories (Set. 2) and ontologial (hidden variable) models (Set. 3); and dene (simul-
taneous) nonontextuality (Set. 4). Then, I aommodate QM in this framework (Set.
5); pik a simple example, the Peres-Mermin square (Set. 6); larify what operational
theories would realize it (Set. 7); and show that the standard spin measurement real-
ization does not do the job (Set. 8). Next, I ategorize KS argument into three types
(Set. 9), investigate the GHZ argument as an argument of type II (Set. 10); show
that arguments of type III an be eetive only if they swith to non-unique realization
(Set. 11) and if they assume Spekkens' ondition (Set. 12). Using a simple toy model,
I ompare Spekkens' ondition and nonontextuality (Set. 13). Finally, I ontrast the
KS arguments with the Bell-type arguments (Set. 14).
2 Operational theories
An operational theory is a physial theory speifying the probability of the outomes of
some measurements performed on a physial system prepared previously in ertain states.
Let s, t, ... ∈ S be the possible states or preparations of the system under investigation. Let
a, b, ... ∈ M b be the basi measurements whih an be performed on the system yielding
the outomes Ai, Bj , ... (i ∈ I, j ∈ J, ...) respetively. Suppose that the measurements
are repeatable and we perform them many times and obtain stable long-run relative
frequenies for the outomes in eah state:
#(Ai ∧ a ∧ s)
#(a ∧ s)
,
#(Bj ∧ b ∧ r)
#(b ∧ r)
, . . .
These relative frequenies allow us to introdue the onditional probabilities of obtain-
ing ertain outomes given that the system has been prepared in ertain states and the
appropriate measurements have been performed:
p(Ai|a ∧ s) , p(Bj |b ∧ r) , . . .
We all a state s ∈ S an eigenstate of the measurement a if
p(Ai|a ∧ s) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ I (1)
If two measurements, say a and b, an be jointly or simultaneously performed, then
the joint frequenies
#(Ai ∧ Bj ∧ a ∧ b ∧ s)
#(a ∧ b ∧ s)
9
Throughout the paper I will use the term quantum ontextuality as the non-existene of a nonon-
textual value-denite ontologial model for QM.
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are also well-dened whih allows us to introdue the joint onditional probabilities:
p(Ai ∧ Bj |a ∧ b ∧ s)
Jointly or simultaneously performable measurements are also alled omeasurable.
Whether two measurements are omeasurable is a physial question. One an measure
the width and the length of a table at the same time. But one annot jointly hekusing
Arthur Fine's examplewhether a given piee of wood is ombustible and whether it an
oat on water. The two measurements annot be simultaneously performed; you annot
burn the piee of wood while in water. Similarly, you are not going to burn the piee of
wood along with throwing it in waterunless you want to test whether the ash oats.
Let M denote the set of all measurements (basi and joint) physially performable on
a system and let the variables x, y range over the measurements in M . The outomes of x
and y are denoted by Xk and Y l, (k ∈ Kx, l ∈ Ly), respetively, and the set of outomes
of all measurements is denoted by O = ∪x{X
k}. Similarly, let the variable r range over
the preparations s, t, ... ∈ S of the system. An operational theory is then given by a set
of onditional probabilities of the outomes for the various basi and joint measurements
in the various preparations:
p(Xk|x ∧ r) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈M and r ∈ S (2)
whih add up to 1 if we sum up for k.
Measurements whih are not jointly measurable are not to be onated with disturbing
measurements. Consider the following example. In the army one performs two tests:
shooting test (a) and tightrope walking (b). The two tests are jointly measurable; soldiers
an well walk on a thin rope and shoot in the meanwhile. However, their performane
in shooting is heavily inuened by whether they are walking on a rope or not while
shooting. Thus, two simultaneous measurements a and b are alled non-disturbing if
p(Ai|a ∧ b ∧ r) = p(Ai|a ∧ r) for all i ∈ I and r ∈ S (3)
p(Bj |a ∧ b ∧ r) = p(Bj |b ∧ r) for all j ∈ J and r ∈ S (4)
For spaelike separated measurements no-disturbane is equivalent to no-signaling.
A non-disturbing operational theory an be haraterized in the following ompat
way. First note that there is a natural partial ordering on the measurements of an op-
erational theory whih expresses how joint the measurements are. a ∧ b is more joint
than a or b. Call the set of basi measurements {a, b, ...} the basis of a measurement x,
if x = a ∧ b ∧ .... Now, for two measurements x, y ∈ M let x > y if the basis of x is
ontained in or equal to the basis of y. Using this partial ordering, an operational theory
is non-disturbing if:
p(Xk|x ∧ r) = p(Xk|y ∧ r) for all k ∈ Kx, r ∈ S and x, y ∈M suh that x > y (5)
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Denote by Mm the set of maximally joint measurements, that is, the set of measure-
ments x for whih there is no other measurement y suh that x > y. For a non-disturbing
operational theory it is enough to speify the onditional probabilities (2) for all x ∈ Mm;
all other onditional probabilities will then be set by (5).
3 Ontologial models
The role of an ontologial model
10
(hidden variable model) is to aount for the onditional
probabilities of an operational theory in terms of underlying realisti entities alled onti
states (hidden variables, elements of reality, beables). An ontologial model denes the
preparations of the system in terms of distributions over the onti states and speies the
response of the system to the dierent measurements in the dierent onti states in terms
of the so-alled response funtions. The ontologial model is suessful if the onditional
probabilities of the operational theory an be reovered in terms of these distributions
and response funtions.
Mathematially, the provision of an ontologial model starts with the speiation the
set Λ of onti states and a variable λ running over Λ. To make things simple we assume
that Λ is ountable.11 Next, we assoiate with eah preparation a probability distribution
over the onti states:
p(λ|r) for all r ∈ S (6)
and to eah measurement and onti state a set of response funtions that is, a set of
onditional probabilities
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈M and λ ∈ Λ (7)
again with the obvious normalization.
One an also impose two natural sreening-o onditions expressing the independene
of the preparations, measurements and onti states. The rst sreening-o ondition,
alled no-onspiray, requires that the probability distributions do not depend ausally,
and hene probabilistially, on the measurements performed on the system:
p(λ|r) = p(λ|r ∧ x) for all x ∈M and r ∈ S (8)
The seond sreening-o ondition, alled λ-suieny, requires that the response fun-
tions do not depend on the preparations in whih the onti states are featuring:
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) = p(Xk|x ∧ λ ∧ r) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈ M, λ ∈ Λ and r ∈ S (9)
10
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But nothing hinges on the ardinality of Λ.
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By means of (8)-(9) and using the theorem of total probability one obtains:
p(Xk|x ∧ r) =
∑
λ
p(Xk|x ∧ λ ∧ r) p(λ|r ∧ x)
=
∑
λ
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) p(λ|r) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈M and r ∈ S (10)
That is, one reovers the operational theory from the ontologial model in terms of the
probability distributions and response funtions.
An onti state λ with respet to a measurement x is alled value-denite if
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) ∈ {0, 1} for all k ∈ Kx (11)
otherwise it is alled probabilisti. Reall that one and same λ an be value-denite for
the one measurement and probabilisti for the other. An ontologial model is alled
value-denite if (11) holds for all x ∈Mm; otherwise it is alled probabilisti.
4 Nonontextuality
Ontologial models, both value-denite and probabilisti, trivially exist for an operational
theory if no further onstraints are put on them. But now require that the ontologial
model is nonontextual.
An ontologial model is (simultaneous) nonontextual if every onti state determines the
probability of the outomes of every measurement independently of what other measure-
ments are simultaneously performed; otherwise is ontextual.
(Simultaneous) nonontextuality an be formally expressed as follows:
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) = p(Xk|y ∧ λ) for all k ∈ Kx, λ ∈ Λ and x, y ∈M suh that x > y(12)
In other words, eah onti state uniquely determines the probability of all outomes of a
given measurement irrespetive of what other measurements are o-measured. A spei
onsequene of (12) is that the onditional probabilities of all basi measurements will be
xed irrespetive of what other measurements they are o-measured with.
Observe, that nonontextuality
12
(12) is almost the same requirement as no-disturbane
(5), exept that the latter is required for the preparations while the former is required
for the onti states. Consequently, nonontextuality provides a neat explanation for why
an operational theory is non-disturbing: if an ontologial model for an operational theory
satises nonontextuality (12) (and also no-onspiray (8) and λ-suieny (9)), then the
12
From now on, I drop the qualier simultaneous but the term nonontextuality will ontinue to
mean simultaneous nonontextuality as dened in (12).
10
operational theory will satisfy no-disturbane (5). Hene, the assumption of nonontex-
tuality is a kind of inferene to the best explanation for the non-disturbing harater of
an operational theory.
Some notes are in plae here. (i) Nonontextuality (12) is a generalization of Shimony's
(1986) parameter independene for situations when the simultaneous measurements are
not neessarily spaelike separated.
(ii) If a value-denite ontologial model is nonontextual, then (11) will hold for all
x ∈M (and not just for x ∈Mm).
(iii) Nonontextuality of an ontologial model does not generally imply fatorization:
p(Xk ∧ Y l|x ∧ y ∧ λ) = p(Xk|x ∧ λ) p(Y l|y ∧ λ) for all k ∈ Kx, l ∈ Ly, λ ∈ Λ
and x, y, x ∧ y ∈M (13)
But it does if the ontologial model is value-denite.
(iv) Nonontextuality as dened in (12) resembles to the onept of nonontextuality
of Simon et al. (2001) but diers from that of Spekkens (2005) and other operationalists.
Below I will refer to this latter onept as Spekkens' ondition.
5 Quantum mehanial representation
On the minimal interpretation QM is an operational theory whih provides onditional
probabilities for the outomes of dierent measurements in dierent states. Thus, the
empirial ontent of QM ould be expressed simply by listing the various onditional
probabilities. However, in the standard formalism these onditional probabilities get
represented in a linear algebrai fashion. The physial system is assoiated with a Hilbert
spae; eah state r ∈ S is represented by a density operator ρˆr; eah measurement x ∈M
by a self-adjoint operator xˆ; and the outomeXk of x by the orthogonal spetral projetion
Pˆ
k
x of xˆ with eigenvalue X
k
. The representation is onneted to experiene by the Born
rule:
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
k
x) = p(X
k|x ∧ r) for all k ∈ Kx, x ∈M and r ∈ S (14)
where Tr is the trae funtion.
Now, if a and b are omeasurable, then a ∧ b gets represented in QM by ommuting
operators aˆ and bˆ. But if aˆ and bˆ are ommuting, then a and b will turn out to be
non-disturbing:
p(Ai|a ∧ b ∧ r) =
∑
j
p(Ai ∧Bj |a ∧ b ∧ r) =
∑
j
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
i
aPˆ
j
b) = Tr(ρˆrPˆ
i
a) = p(A
i|a ∧ r) for all i ∈ I and r ∈ S
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and similarly for p(Bj|a ∧ b ∧ r). Thus, the quantum mehanial representation of joint
measurements implies that QM annot represent omeasurable but disturbing measure-
ments. In other words, only non-disturbing operational theories an have a quantum
mehanial representation.
Being an operational theory, one an searh for an ontologial model for QM. The
KS arguments are intending to rule out suh an ontologial model if it is both value-
denite and nonontextual.
13
In the following setions I pik a speial KS theorem, the
Peres-Mermin square (Peres, 1990; Mermin, 1992) and investigate whether it an be
given a unique realization, that is, an operational theory omposed of 9 simultaneous
measurements whih does not admit a value-denite, nonontextual ontologial model.
6 An example: the Peres-Mermin square
Consider the following 3×3 matrix of self-adjoint operators:
aˆ ≡ σˆ3 ⊗ 1ˆ bˆ ≡ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ3 cˆ ≡ σˆ3 ⊗ σˆ3
dˆ ≡ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ1 eˆ ≡ σˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ fˆ ≡ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1
gˆ ≡ σˆ3 ⊗ σˆ1 hˆ ≡ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ3 iˆ ≡ σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ2
where σˆ1, σˆ2 and σˆ3 are the Pauli operators and 1ˆ is the unit operator on the two
dimensional omplex Hilbert spae. The operators in the matrix are arranged in suh
a way that two operators are ommuting if and only if they are in the same row or in
the same olumn. Eah operator in the matrix has two eigenvalues, ±1. Denote the
spetral projetions of the operators aˆ, bˆ, cˆ, ... assoiated with the eigenvalues ±1 by
Pˆ
±
a , Pˆ
±
b , Pˆ
±
c , ..., respetively. Let the variables xˆ, yˆ, and zˆ range over the operators of
the Peres-Mermin square. Denote the spetral projetions of xˆ, yˆ, and zˆ by Pˆ
j
x, Pˆ
k
y , and
Pˆ
l
z (j, k, l = ±1), respetively. The set of states S is represented by the set of density
operators on the two dimensional omplex Hilbert spae (whih also inlude the ommon
eigenstates for eah subset of mutually ommuting operators).
The quantum probabilities for the spetral projetions of the three vertial and three
horizontal ommuting triples of operators are given by the trae formula:
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
±
x Pˆ
±
y Pˆ
±
z ) for all ρr density operators (15)
Now, it turns out that these quantum probabilities are non-zero only for ertain ombi-
nations of spetral projetions for a given ommuting triple (irrespetive of the quantum
13
The restrition to value-deniteness is dropped in ertain arguments (Mazurek et al. 2016), but here
nonontextuality is dened as measurement nonontextuality á la Spekkens (2005) and not as (12).
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state). More speially, for the third vertial triple ({cˆ, fˆ , iˆ}) the quantum probabili-
ties are non-zero only for those ombinations of projetions for whih the produt of the
assoiated eigenvalues is −1. For the other ve triples this produt must be +1. That is,
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
j
xPˆ
k
yPˆ
l
z) 6= 0 only if
{
j · k · l = −1 if {xˆ, yˆ, zˆ} = {cˆ, fˆ , iˆ}
j · k · l = +1 otherwise
(16)
Note that these admissible ombinations of eigenvalues are also assoiated with the four
ommon eigenstates of the triplet in question.
Now, these admissible ombinations of eigenvalues provide a onstraint on the value
assignments that is, on the funtions sending eah of the nine operators of the Peres-
Mermin square to one of their eigenvalues, that is, to ±1. The onstraint is that the
produt of the numbers in eah row and olumn should be +1, exept for the third
olumn where it should be −1. It is easy to see that no suh value assignment exists.
But does this no-go result prove that QM does not admit a nonontextual value-
denite ontologial model? Not until the Peres-Mermin square is given a unique physial
realization.
7 An operational theory realizing the Peres-Mermin
square
Consider an operational theory with 9 basi measurements:
a b c
d e f
g h i
The 3×3matrix in whih the measurements are arranged is to express now omeasurability
relations: measurements are simultaneously measurable if and only if they are in the same
row or in the same olumn.
Eah measurement an have two outomes, A±, B±, C±, ... = ±1. Let the variables
x, y and z range over the basi measurements M b. Denote the outomes of x, y and z
by Xj, Y k and Z l (j, k, l = ±1), respetively. Let the onditional probability of the 6
dierent maximally joint measurements be:
p(X± ∧ Y ± ∧ Z± | x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ r) for all r ∈ S (17)
Suppose furthermore that the ondition probabilities of all other non-maximally joint
measurements an be obtained from (17) by marginalization. Thus, (17) haraterizes a
non-disturbing operational theory.
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Now, suppose that the operational theory (17) is a physial realization of the Peres-
Mermin square in the sense that the quantum probabilities (15) in the Peres-Mermin
square represent just the onditional probabilities (17) via the Born rule (14). That is,
Tr(ρˆrPˆ
j
xPˆ
k
yPˆ
l
z) = p(X
j ∧ Y k ∧ Z l|x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ r) for all r ∈ S (18)
Note that (18) is well-dened sine the operators on the left hand side are mutually
ommuting if and only if the represented measurements on the right hand side are omea-
surable. Also note that the operational theory (17) is a unique realization of the Peres-
Mermin square, sine every operator is assoiated with a dierent measurement. As we
saw in the Introdution, only unique realizations an deide on the status of nonontex-
tuality in QM. (In Setion 11 we will see what non-unique realizations an do.)
From (16) and (18) it follows that the support of the probability distributions over
the outomes that is, the set of possible outomes for eah maximally joint measurement
x ∧ y ∧ z and eah preparation r ∈ S is the following:
p(Xj ∧ Y k ∧ Z l | x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ r) 6= 0 only if
{
j · k · l = −1 if {x, y, z} = {c, f, i}
j · k · l = +1 otherwise
(19)
that is, the onditional probability is non-zero only for suh joint outomes whih ontain
an odd number of +1s and an even number of −1s in eah row and olumn, exept for
the last olumn where the number of +1s is even and the number of −1s is odd.
Does the operational theory (17) have a nonontextual value-denite ontologial model?
Assume (ontrary to fat) that there is suh a model with response funtions:
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p(X± ∧ Y ± ∧ Z± | x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ λ) for all λ ∈ Λ (20)
Being nonontextual and value-denite, the response funtions are fatorizing:
p(X± ∧ Y ± ∧ Z± | x ∧ y ∧ z ∧ λ) = p(X± | x ∧ λ) p(Y ± | y ∧ λ) p(Z± | z ∧ λ) (21)
for all λ ∈ Λ. Thus, the ontologial model an be haraterized by the extremal onditional
probabilities:
p(X± | x ∧ λ) ∈ {0, 1} for all x ∈M b and λ ∈ Λ (22)
However, the support (19) of the operational theory restrits the possible extremal
onditional probabilities. Namely, for any three simultaneous measurements x, y and z
in M b and λ ∈ Λ one requires that
p(Xj | x ∧ λ) p(Y k | y ∧ λ) p(Z l | z ∧ λ) = 1 only if
{
j · k · l = −1 if {x, y, z} = {c, f, i}
j · k · l = +1 otherwise
(23)
14
Note that for this argument we don't need the probability distributions p(λ|r).
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otherwise there ould be some onti states whih, if prepared (that is, p(λ|r) 6= 0 for some
r ∈ S), would render at least one onditional probability in (17) non-zero outside the
support (19).
However, it is easy to see that there is no suh a set of onditional probabilities (22)
whih satises (23). This is due to the impossibility to ll in a 3×3 matrix with ±1s suh
that the produt of the numbers in eah row and olumn is +1, exept for the last olumn
where it is −1. Consequently, the operational theory (17) does not have a nonontextual
value-denite ontologial model.
Let me briey reet on the question of experimental testability of the above operational
theory. Suppose that in a real experiment the support equation (19) annot be sharply
validated but only up to a fration 1 − ǫ of all runs. How small ǫ should be so that
a nonontextual value-denite ontologial model for the operational theory an still be
ruled out?
Suppose a ontrario that the ontologial model is nonontextual and it onforms to
the measurement statistis as muh as possible, that is, for all λ ∈ Λ only one of the six
onstraints (23) is violated. (For example some λ assigns +1 to all 9 measurements, vio-
lating thus the onstraint of the third olumn but respeting all the other ve, et.) Sine
there are six dierent triply joint measurements (of the three rows and three olumns),
henemodulo some onspiraythere is a 1/6 probability for any λ that a ertain joint
measurement will pik just that triple for whih (23) is violated. Sine eah suh measure-
ment will ontribute to the violation of (19), (19) will be violated in a fration of 1/6 of
all runs. Consequently, if in a real experiment ǫ is smaller than 1/6, then the experiment
will rule out a nonontextual value-denite ontologial model for the operational theory.
This argument is a speial ase of a general argument provided by Simon et al. (2001)
and Larsson (2002) in the defense of the KS arguments against the so-alled nite pre-
ision loophole argument of Meyer (1999), and Clifton and Kent (2000). As Barrett and
Kent (2004, Setion 4.3) niely point out, the nite preision loophole is eetive only if
nonontextuality is dened in terms of operators on a Hilbert spae and not operationally
in terms of measurementsin short, only if KS arguments are understood as KS theorems.
Thus, the nite preision loophole arguments do not nullify the KS arguments based on
the above operational theory.
8 Do spin measurements realize the Peres-Mermin square?
The only question that remains is thus whether there exists an operational theory physi-
ally realizing the Peres-Mermin square?
The rst idea that omes to mind is the standard spin measurements. Suppose that
the operator σˆi ⊗ σˆj (i, j = 1, 2, 3) represents the measurement that rst we perform
two spin measurements by two Stern-Gerlah magnets on a pair of spin-
1
2
partiles in
diretions
~i and ~j, respetively (~i,~j ∈ {~x, ~y, ~z}; ~x, ~y and ~z are mutually perpendiular);
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and seond we hek whether the outomes of the measurements on the opposite wings
are the same (+1) or not (−1). Denote this omposite measurement, symbolially, by
(si ∧ sj)
±
. Furthermore, let σˆi ⊗ 1ˆ (i = 1, 2, 3) and 1ˆ⊗ σˆj (j = 1, 2, 3) represent that we
perform the spin measurement only on the left and right partile, respetively. Denote
these singular spin measurements, symbolially, by si ∧ 1 and 1 ∧ sj, respetively. Then,
the measurements realizing uniquely the Peres-Mermin square read as follows:
a ≡ s3 ∧ 1 b ≡ 1 ∧ s3 c ≡ (s3 ∧ s3)
±
d ≡ 1 ∧ s1 e ≡ s1 ∧ 1 f ≡ (s1 ∧ s1)
±
g ≡ (s3 ∧ s1)
± h ≡ (s1 ∧ s3)
± i ≡ (s2 ∧ s2)
±
Unfortunately, however, only four of the six ommuting subsets of operators represent
simultaneous measurements: the rst two rows and the rst two olumns. Measurements
in the third row and in the third olumn are, however, not omeasurable. For example,
the measurements c, f and i in the third olumn, that is, the spin measurements in
diretions ~z−~z, ~x−~x, and ~y−~y annot be simultaneously performed: one annot turn the
Stern-Gerlah magnets in diretions ~z−~z, ~x−~x, and ~y−~y at the same time. Consequently,
although the left hand side of (18) exists, the right hand side is ill-dened for the third
olumn and also for the third row. The quantum probabilities
Tr(ρˆr Pˆ
±
c Pˆ
±
f Pˆ
±
i )
Tr(ρˆr Pˆ
±
g Pˆ
±
h Pˆ
±
i )
annot be interpreted as onditional probabilities
p(C± ∧ F± ∧ I± | c ∧ f ∧ i ∧ r)
p(G± ∧H± ∧ I± | g ∧ h ∧ i ∧ r)
and hene neither their support is dened. So one does not have the onstraint
p(C i | c ∧ λ) p(F j | f ∧ λ) p(Ik | i ∧ λ) = 1 only if j · k · l = −1 (24)
p(Gi | c ∧ λ) p(Hj | f ∧ λ) p(Ik | i ∧ λ) = 1 only if j · k · l = 1 (25)
for the onti states in the third olumn and third row and hene annot arrive at the
ontradition outlined above. The whole argumentation ollapses. In short, the standard
spin measurement does not realize the Peres-Mermin square in form of an operational
theory (17), and onsequently does not provide a physial realization for a quantum
mehanial senario for whih a nonontextual value-denite ontologial model ould be
ruled out.
Obviously, the standard realization of the above operators in terms of spin measure-
ments is not the only possible physial realization. One may well ome up with another
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unique realization on whih the measurements are omeasurable if and only if the rep-
resenting operators are ommuting. However, I know of no suh realization. And the
burden of proof is on those who laim that the above arrangement of operators exlude
a nonontextual value-denite ontologial model for QM. An uninterpreted formalism
annot prove anything about the outer world.
15
Perhaps it is worth reeting for a moment on the relation of ommutativity and omeasur-
ability (see Park and Margenau, 1968). Comeasurability is used in two dierent meanings
in quantum physis. First, two measurements are alled omeasurable (ompatible, si-
multaneously measurable) if, performing them one after another, the rst measurement
does not alter the outome statistis of the seond one. Obviously, this usage of the term
simultaneous is metaphori and has no bearing on the KS arguments.
The other meaning is the one we use throughout this paper: two measurement are
omeasurable if they an physially be performed at the same time on the same system.
Note, however, that this notion of omeasurability and the notion of ommutativity are
not synonym expressions. From the simple fat that two measurements are represented
by ommuting operators it does not follow that the measurements are simultaneously
performable. Comeasurability is a physial question whih annot be simply read o
from their representation. Simultaneous measurements get represented in QM by om-
muting operators. But the onverse is not true. Not all ommuting operators represent
simultaneous measurements. Consider the following three pairs of ommuting operators:
[
Sˆ
2
1
, Sˆ
2
2
]
= 0
[σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ3 , σˆ3 ⊗ σˆ1] = 0
[σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1 , σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ1] = 0
where Sˆ1, Sˆ2 and σˆ1, σˆ2 are spin-1 and spin-
1
2
operators, respetively. Eah pair is fea-
turing in one or other of a renowned KS argument: the rst pair in the original Kohen-
Speker (1967) argument; the seond in Peres' (1990) and Mermin's (1992) version and
also in Cabello's (1997) version; and the third in the GHZ (1989) version of the argu-
ment. However, none of them an be interpreted as operators representing simultaneous
spin measurements on pairs or triples of spin-1 or spin-1
2
partiles. But in the absene
of a unique realization of a KS graph where ommuting operators represent simultaneous
measurements, the no-go results do not prove that QM does not admit a nonontextual
value-denite ontologial model.
How then the above KS arguments work?
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But one might respond: why not to measure c, f and i simultaneously by one single global mea-
surement (Rek et al., 1994)? We return to this question in Setion 11.
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9 Three types of Kohen-Speker arguments
To see the problem more learly, it is worth introduing the following ategorization. Sup-
pose we are given a unique realization, that is, a KS graph and an assoiated operational
theory realizing the operators on the graph in a one-to-one manner. Now, one an ast the
KS arguments into three types aording to the number of subsets of mutually ommuting
operators (operators on a hyperedge) whih do not represent simultaneous measurements
in the assoiated operational theory:
Arguments of type I: where all ommuting subsets represent simultaneous measure-
ments;
Arguments of type II: where all but one ommuting subset represent simultaneous
measurements;
Arguments of type III: where there is more than one ommuting subset not repre-
senting simultaneous measurements.
As it will turn out soon, there is a huge dierene in the eay of the three types of
arguments.
It is only KS arguments of type I whih provide a state-independent (algebrai) proof
for quantum ontextuality, sine for these arguments FUNC an be physially justied
by the probability distribution of the joint outomes of simultaneous measurements. Un-
fortunately, I am not aware of any argument of type I. In other words, I am not aware
of any unique realization of any KS graph where all ommuting subsets of operators
would represent simultaneous measurements. Consequently, I am also not aware of any
state-independent argument proving quantum ontextuality.
KS arguments of type II do exist but they provide only a state-dependent proof for
quantum ontextuality. An example for suh an arguments is the GHZ argument. I return
to this argument in the next setion.
Finally, KS arguments of type III abound. The Peres-Mermin square with the stan-
dard spin realization is one example: the number of ommuting subsets not representing
simultaneous measurements is two, the three operators in the third row and the three
operators in the third olumn. Another example for arguments of type III is the original
KS graph with 117 verties with the standard spin realization. Here none of the ommut-
ing subsets represents simultaneous measurements sine the spin measurements for three
orthogonal diretions annot be simultaneously performed. In setion 11, I will argue
that arguments of type III are inonlusive in proving quantum ontextuality. To get a
ontradition, they need to ip to a non-unique (hyperedge-based) realization and invoke
Spekkens' ondition. However, by abandoning Spekkens' ondition the ontradition an
be avoided.
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10 Kohen-Speker arguments of type II
Let us see rst the KS arguments of type II. A prototype of suh arguments is the GHZ
argument. The GHZ graph (pentagram) reads as follows:
σˆ2 ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ
σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ1 σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ1 σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ2 σˆ1 ⊗ σˆ2 ⊗ σˆ2
1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ1 1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ2
σˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ 1ˆ
1ˆ⊗ σˆ2 ⊗ 1ˆ 1ˆ⊗ σˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ
On the standard spin realization of the GHZ graph, all but one subsets of the mutu-
ally ommuting operators an be interpreted as representing simultaneous measurements.
Measurements represented by ommuting operators on four of the ve edges of the GHZ
pentagram are omeasurable sine they are performed on three spaelike separated sub-
systems. But the measurements represented by the operators on the fth, horizontal edge
are not omeasurable.
How does then the KS argument work in the GHZ ase?
The trik to irumvent the problem of non-omeasurability is to prepare the system
in one of the ommon eigenstates of the measurements on the horizontal edge.
16
The
outome for eah measurement on the horizontal edge will then be xed even if the
measurements are not omeasurable. The produt of the possible outomes of the four
dierent measurements will turn out to be −1 in eah ommon eigenstate. Now, the
measurements on the other four lines of the GHZ pentagram are omeasurable, and the
produt of their possible joint outomes in all states (among them in the above ommon
eigenstates) will be +1. This means that eah onti state in the support of these ommon
eigenstates needs to assigns ±1 to the individual measurements suh that the produt
of these numbers is +1 in eah line, exept in the horizontal line where it is −1. Suh
value assignment, however, is impossible, whih rules out a nonontextual value-denite
ontologial model for the GHZ senario.
More generally, KS arguments of type II where all but one set of ommuting operators
represent simultaneous measurements are all state-dependent arguments. One needs to
prepare the system in one of the ommon eigenstates of the non-omeasurable measure-
ments to ompensate the failure of omeasurability of these measurements. By doing
16
See (1) for how an eigenstate for a measurement is dened.
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so one obtains the same onstraint on the response funtions (neessary for deriving the
ontradition) as one would obtain if the measurements were omeasurable. But note
that these argument of type II annot be transformed into a state-independent argument.
They work only if the system is prepared in one of the ommon eigenstates of the operators
representing non-omeasurable measurements.
11 Kohen-Speker arguments of type III
Finally, let us turn to the KS arguments of type III that is, to arguments where there is
more than one ommuting subset not representing simultaneous measurements. Here the
strategy outlined in the previous setion does not work. Even if one prepares the system in
a ommon eigenstate of a set of operators representing non-omeasurable measurements,
there remains at least one other set of non-omeasurable measurements for whih the joint
outomes are not known. This bloks the KS argument sine the onstraint on the onti
state oming from this very set of measurements will be missing.
One might however raise the question: Why not simply replae a ommuting subset not
representing simultaneous measurements by one single measurement and apply ertain
funtions on the result? Then the omeasurability problem would be solved.
Well, it is indeed a mathematial fat that for any nite set {aˆi} of mutually ommut-
ing operators there exists an operator bˆ and a set of funtions {fi} suh that aˆi = fi(bˆ)
(Halmos, 1958). Note, however, that from this mathematial fat it does not follow that
there also is a physial measurement b represented by the operator bˆ. The existene of
suh a measurement is a physial question whih does not automatially follow from the
existene of the operator bˆ.
But now suppose that in a KS argument of type III we replae every subset of non-
omeasurable measurements {ai} realizing {aˆi} by one single measurement b suh that
the funtions {fi(b)} also realize {aˆi}. Will it turn the argument of type III into an
argument of type I?
No, it will not. Replaing non-omeasurable measurements by funtions of one single
measurement renders the realization hyperedge-based. But then we fae the following
problem: To test nonontextuality, we need to provide a unique realization of the KS graph
and guarantee that all subsets of mutually ommuting operators represent simultaneous
measurements. However, as Lemma in the Introdution shows, suh a realization annot
be hyperedge-based. So we need to give up the uniqueness of the realization, that is,
we need to assoiate at least one operator with more than one measurement. These
measurements will be physially dierent but will be represented by the same operator.
Operationally this means that they have the same distribution of outomes in every
quantum state. To get the no-go result, however, one needs to assume more: namely
that they have the same distribution of outomes in every onti state, or in other words,
they have the same set of response funtions. This assumption, however, is an extra
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assumption, dierent from nonontextuality. By abandoned it the KS argument an be
bloked.
To sum up, KS arguments of type III do not prove quantum ontextuality sine FUNC
annot be physially justied for at least one set mutually ommuting operators in the
argument. Replaing non-omeasurable measurements by funtions of one single mea-
surement does not solve the problem either sine either we stik to unique realization
but then some hyperedges will not represent simultaneous measurements; or we swith to
non-unique realization but then we need to use an extra assumption in the argument. To
this assumption we turn in the next setion.
12 Spekkens' ondition
Rob Spekkens (2005) introdued a onstraint on ontologial models and alled it measure-
ment nonontextuality.
17
He took it to be a generalization of the quantum mehanial
nonontextuality for operational theories. I share Spekkens' view that his requirement
plays an important role in the KS arguments but, as explained in the Introdution, I on-
test that it expresses nonontextuality.
18
Hene, I will refer to Spekkens' nonontextuality
simply as Spekkens' ondition:
If the probability of an outome of a measurement is the same as the probability of an
outome of another measurement in every preparation, then the probability of the outomes
for the two measurements should also be the same in all onti states.
Formally, if for some x, y ∈M , k ∈ Kx, and l ∈ Ly
p(Xk|x ∧ r) = p(Y l|y ∧ r) for all r ∈ S (26)
then
p(Xk|x ∧ λ) = p(Y l|y ∧ λ) for all λ ∈ Λ (27)
Now, Spekkens' ondition gives rise to a line of ounterfatual reasoning. If we measure
x in a ertain run of the experiment and obtain the outome Xk, then, if the ontologial
model is value-denite with respet to x and y, we an onlude based upon Spekkens'
ondition that had we measured y, we would have obtained Y l. But note that Spekkens'
ondition is not an assumption about possible worlds but a restrition on the ontologial
models for an operational theory.
Spekkens' ondition, similarly to nonontextuality (12), is also a kind of inferene to
the best explanation: if (27) and also no-onspiray (8) and λ-suieny (9) hold for an
17
See also (Liang et al., 2011), (Leifer, 2014) and (Krishna et al., 2017).
18
For a ritiism of Spekkens operational denition of measurement nonontextualitybased on a
ritiism of operationalismsee (Hermens 2011).
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ontologial model, then we obtain a neat explanation why (26) holds. The explanandum
in the ase of nonontextuality is no-disturbane, in the ase of Spekkens' ondition it is
the statistial math between outomes of dierent measurements.
Note that Spekkens' ondition (26)-(27) is logially independent from ontextuality
(12). Spekkens' ondition does not rely on simultaneous measurability, while ontextual-
ity does. If there are no simultaneous measurements in an operational theory, then eah
ontologial model will be nonontextual sine (12) is fullled vauously. Still, the model
an violate Spekkens' ondition (26)-(27) if there are measurements yielding ertain out-
omes with the same probability in every state and diering in their response funtions.
Conversely, if premise (26) is not satised in an operational theory, then Spekkens' on-
dition is fullled vauously. But if the theory is disturbing, the ontologial model an
still be ontextual. In a non-disturbing operational theory, however, (26) holds for all x
and y suh that x > y. Consequently, if Spekkens' ondition holds, nonontextuality will
also hold. In short, in a non-disturbing operational theory (like QM) Spekkens' ondition
implies nonontextuality.
It is instrutive to see what an ontologial model whih violates Spekkens' ondition
look like. If (26) holds in an operational theory but (27) does not, then the distributions
of onti states representing the preparations annot be arbitrary. Thus the violation of
Spekkens' ondition puts a onstraint on the possible distributions of onti states: one
annot pik arbitrarily from onti states when preparing the system. Preparations must
be omposed from the underlying onti states aording to a ertain pattern whih is
sensitive to how the onti states respond to ertain measurements. But note that it is not
an a priori truth that any probability distribution of onti states represents a physially
possible preparation. There may well be many physial reasons whih restrit the possible
preparations of a system and Spekkens' ondition is only one among those.
As we saw in the previous setion, Spekkens' ondition plays a ruial role in non-
unique KS arguments. In these arguments ertain operators of the KS graph will be
realized by two dierent measurements. The two dierent measurements, however
being represented by the same operatorwill have the same outome statistis. But this
is exatly the anteedent (26) of Spekkens' ondition. The role of Spekkens' ondition is
to ensure the onsequent (27), that is, to ensure that the response funtions of the two
dierent measurements are perfetly orrelated. By this assumption the no-go result an
be derived. Thus, non-unique KS arguments heavily rely on Spekkens' ondition.
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There are exeptions, however. In ertain KS arguments the onstraint (27) is not obtained via
Spekkens' ondition but through some other (often ounterfatual) reasonings. In Lapkiewiz et al.
(2011), for example, an experiment is devised to prove the violation of the Klyahko-Can-Biniio§lu-
Shumovsky inequality (2008). To get the onlusion (to lose the pentagram), however, the authors
needed to assume that the response of system on two not simultaneous measurements (A1 and A
′
1
in the
paper) are perfetly orrelated. This is just a onstraint of type (27).
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13 A simple toy model
Before onluding, it is worth reeting one more on the dierene between nonontextu-
ality and Spekkens' ondition (the rst and seond interpretations of nonontextuality, as
we alled them in the Introdution) and illustrating this dierene on a simple toy model.
Suppose we ll a box with balls and perform two sorts of basi measurements: we pull
a ball from the box and hek its olor or its size. The possible outomes for the olor
measurement are blak and white; for the size measurement the outomes are big and
small. Repeating the measurement many times we get long-run relative frequenies for
the various measurement outomes. The two measurements are omeasurable, hene also
the probability distribution over the joint outomes an be determined. Suppose further-
more that our operational theory is (i) non-disturbing and (ii) it satises the anteedent
of the Spekkens' ondition: for every preparation, that is, for every lling up the box with
balls, the probability of pulling a blak ball upon olor measurement is the same as the
probability of pulling a big ball upon size measurement.
We would like to onstrut an ontologial model for our operational theory. The
model is nonontextual if, given an onti state, the probability of all four measurement
outomes is independent of whether we produe it by a basi or a joint measurement.
The model satises Spekkens' ondition if, given an onti state, the probability of the
outome blak/white upon olor measurement is the same as the probability of the out-
ome big/small upon size measurement.
An ontologial model whih is both nonontextual and also satises Spekkens' ondi-
tion is the following: there are just two types of balls in the box: one type is blak and
big, the other type is white and small. Upon measuring the olor of the rst type of ball
we get invariable the outome blak independently of whether we o-measure the size or
not (and similarly for the other outomes). This model neatly explains the above two
probabilisti fats, (i) and (ii), of the operational theory.
But there are ontologial models in whih one of the two requirements is violated.
An example of a model satisfying nonontextuality but not Spekkens' ondition is the
following: there are now four types of balls in the box: blak and big; blak and small;
white and big; white and small. However, (for some physial reason) we an prepare the
box only in suh a way that there is exatly as many blak and small balls in the box as
there are white and big balls. Consequently, although Spekkens' ondition is violated, we
get as often blak balls upon olor measurement as big balls upon size measurement.
For an ontologial model violating nonontextuality but not Spekkens' ondition we
need to hange our non-disturbing operational theory into a disturbing one.
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Thus,
suppose that there are again two types of balls in the box: blak and big; white and small.
Performing a basi measurement (olor, size) these onti state invariably provide the
orresponding outome. However, for joint measurements (olor and size) the outomes
20
Sine, as we saw in the previous setion, in non-disturbing operational theories Spekkens' ondition
implies nonontextuality.
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ip: for the onti state blak and big, for example, the outome for the joint measurement
will be white and small. The model is ontextual but satises Spekkens' ondition: the
probability of getting a blak ball upon olor measurement is the same as the probability of
getting a big ball upon size measurement in eah preparationboth equal to the relative
frequeny of blak and big balls in that preparation.
As the toy models attest, nonontextuality and Spekkens' ondition are dierent and
logially independent assumptions.
14 Conlusions
In the paper I have argued that a KS argument an rule out a nonontextual value-
denite ontologial model for QM in a state-independent way only if the KS graph on
whih the argument is based is (i) given a unique realization suh that (ii) mutually
ommuting operators represent simultaneous measurements. If one abandons (i), then
sine some operators will be realized by multiple measurementsone needs to assume
Spekkens' ondition. By giving up Spekkens' ondition, however, the no-go result an be
bloked. If one abandons (ii), the onstraint FUNC on the value assignments annot be
physially justied. All in all, if nonontextuality is interpreted as the robustness of a
system's response to a measurement against other simultaneous measurements, then KS
arguments annot provide an algebrai for proof quantum ontextuality.
It is important to note that the main thrust of this negative laim was not to hallenge
the view that QM does not admit a nonontextual value-denite ontologial model. It
does not. State-dependent arguments (like the GHZ argument) provide a perfet proof to
this eet. The aim of the paper was to hallenge the view that KS arguments an prove
this fat in a purely algebrai way based exlusively on measurements and not states (and
in this sense the KS arguments would be stronger than the state-dependent Bell-type
arguments).
But how do we know whether ommuting operators represent simultaneous measure-
ments or not? Well, the formalism of QM does not give us a denite answer. One annot
avoid going bak and see what kind of measurements the operators are representing. A
speial way to ensure omeasurability (in a somewhat extended meaning) is to perform
the measurements on two or more subsystems of a physial system. These subsystems are
typially spaelike separated parts of a bigger system. In the ase of spaelike separated
measurements nonontextuality (12) amounts to a loality requirement, alled parameter
independene: measurements performed on a subsystem annot inuene the response
funtions of another measurement on a spaelike separated other subsystem.
Nonontextuality as parameter independene plays a ruial role in the Bell-type ar-
guments. In these arguments simultaneous measurability is guaranteed by spaelike sepa-
ration. KS arguments, however, are not designed speially against loality but against
nonontextuality in general. Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether there exist
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suh KS arguments in whih simultaneous measurability is not guaranteed by spaelike
separation. Obviously, the most baing form of ontextuality is nonloality. But it
would be instrutive to see whether there are other softer versions of ontextuality with
no appeal to loality. To unover suh ontextuality, one should nd a family of simul-
taneous measurements whih are performed on the same system (and not on spaelike
separated subsystems) and formulate a KS argument based on these measurements. The
omeasurability of these measurements should then be justied by expliitly identifying
experimental proedures whih an be performed on the same system at the same time,
like measuring length and width of a table. Suh omeasurability would then not appeal
to loality but would be justied by the detailed physial desription of the measurement
proesses. Can we ome up with a KS argument where omeasurability is grounded in
suh a way? Does there exist a genuine KS argument with no appeal to loality? I don't
know the answer.
A similarly open question onerns the lak of KS arguments of type I, where all
sets of ommuting operators represent simultaneous measurements (whether realized by
spaelike separation or not). Why are there no arguments providing a state-independent
proof for quantum ontextuality? Is there a theoretial reason for their non-existene; or
are they simply not found beause they are not looked hard enough (partly due to the
negligene of the dierene between ommutativity and omeasurability)? Again, I have
no answer.
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